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Forgive

In a book chapter titled “The Psychology of Forgiveness” (2002), psychologists Charlotte vanOyen-Witvliet and Michael McCullough write: “Many of the world’s religions have articulated the concept of forgiveness for millennia. Indeed, the proposition that people have been forgiven by God and, as a result, should forgive their transgressors is common to all three great monotheistic traditions” (p. 447).

Perhaps due to its clear enunciation throughout religion, social scientists had ignored forgiveness as a topic of study for several centuries. However, nowadays “it crosses cultures and continents, disciplines and dogmas… (and) is a much discussed subject in anthropological, sociological, political, and psychological circles” (2000, p. 1143).

In a paper titled “Forgiveness: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature” (1998), James N. Sells and Terry D. Hargrave highlight a Jungian perspective on forgiveness, both in relation to others and in regard to the self, that defines it as a restorative instrument which can relieve guilt and help with the integration of archetypes, “particularly themes from one’s shadow, into a transcending self” (p. 26).

Does becoming fully human, becoming whole, demand that we overcome a deeply ingrained tendency to retaliate or seek retribution? McCullough states that the “forgiving personality” includes aspects of agreeableness, emotional stability, and a positive correlation with spiritual well-being (2001, p. 195). As part of its redemptive benefits, the “forgiveness response” accordingly enables the cultivation of virtue, and the development of “prosocial” capital (2001) “that helps social units such as marriages, families, and communities to operate more harmoniously” (2002, p. 454). These important traits become “channelized” into characteristic human adaptations which, “as an interdependent people, we simply have too much at stake to ignore the promise of… as a balm for some of our species’ destructive propensities”. Research further suggests that forgiveness may foster coronary health by “reducing the adverse physical effects of sustained anger and hostility”, while people who do not forgive their offenders could incur emotional and physiological costs (2002, p. 452, 453, 455).

Although a forgiving response may garner “psychophysiological benefits, at least in the short term” according to vanOyen-Witvliet and McCullough (p. 453), the picture is more complicated as certain sensitive people will nonetheless suffer health costs despite their offering forgiveness, or that forgiving an abuser might yield negative “psychological sequelae” (p. 454). Sells and Hargrave declare that the dangers of such “pseudo-forgiveness” could include avoidance, denial, injustice, manipulation, or perpetuation of injury (1998, p. 25).

Scholars Frank D. Fincham and Julie H. Hall conceptualize “self-forgiveness” as a set of motivational changes through which individuals learn to accept themselves and become less likely to engage in self-punishing behaviours (2005, p. 622). However, in cases of “pseudo-self-forgiveness”, where feelings of guilt or regret and a corresponding acceptance of responsibility are not fully acknowledged, a tendency towards self-centeredness, and disrespect towards the victim, may be evident (p. 626 – 628).

Author and doctor Aaron Lazare recognizes that in contrast to the often difficult work of apology, forgiveness tends to provide an unburdening, both to the transgressor and to the victim:

“We experience forgiveness as a gift that releases us from the twin burdens of guilt and shame. In addition, if we are the ones doing the forgiving, we are proud of our generous behavior in forgiving the offending party. We had the power to forgive and we used it benevolently” (2004, p. 228 – 229).

Fincham, F. D., & Hall, J. H. (2005), Self-Forgiveness: The Stepchild of Forgiveness Research, in the Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Volume 24, Number 5, (pp. 621 – 637).

Hargrave, T. D., & Sells, J. N. (1998), Forgiveness: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, in the Journal of Family Therapy, Issue 20 (pp. 21 – 36). Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers.

Lazare, A. (2004) On Apology. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.

McCullough, M. E. (December 2001), Forgiveness: Who Does It and How Do They Do It?, in Current Directions in Psychological Science, Volume 10, Issue 6 (pp. 194 – 197). American Psychological Society, Blackwell Publishers Inc.

McCullough, M. E., & vanOyen Witvliet, C. (2002), The Psychology of Forgiveness, in Lopez, S. J., Snyder, C. R., (Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology, (Chapter 32, pp. 446 – 456). New York, United States: Oxford University Press.

Taft, L. (January 2000), Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, in The Yale Law Journal, Volume 109: 1135, (pp. 1135 – 1160). New Haven, United States: The Yale Law Journal Co.

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Story

According to anthropologist David Graeber and archeologist David Wengrow in their book “The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity” (2021), Indigenous North Americans were known for their powers of eloquence and rhetoric as observed by the Jesuit and European settlers who, in spite of their genocidal campaigns, could be “reduced to tears” by the Natives’ persuasiveness, logical argumentation, and appeals to sentiment using metaphor, myth, and humour. Rational and skeptical conversational approaches formed the basis of an “indigenous critique” of European culture that viewed these settlers as “continually squabbling for advantage” with corresponding disorders observed “as being occasioned by money” and which, the authors propose, then informed much discourse of the concurrent European Enlightenment. Graeber and Wengrow further suggest that the guidance provided by the Indigenous critics, including Wendat statesman Kondiaronk, today helps enable a tracing much further back in time to see what initially made the emergence of kings, priests, and overseers possible, and thus provides a new lens through which to interpret historical evidence (2021, p. 52, 76).

“It was largely the speakers of Iroquoian languages such as the Wendat, or the five Haudenosaunee nations to their south, who appear to have placed such weight on reasoned debate – even finding it a form of pleasurable entertainment in its own right. This fact alone had major historical repercussions. Because it appears to have been exactly this form of debate – rational, skeptical, empirical, conversational in tone – which came to be identified with the European Enlightenment as well. And, like the Jesuits, Enlightenment thinkers and democratic revolutionaries saw it as intrinsically connected with the rejection of arbitrary authority, particularly which had long been assumed by the clergy” (2021, p. 46).

In an essay titled “Strangers in a Not So Strange Land” (2021), Indigenous playwright and author Drew Hayden Taylor suggests Native storytelling, rich with metaphor and insight and comprising much new writing in the evocative science fiction genre, can help elucidate their struggles. Modern Indigenous science fiction has become popular, according to Taylor, as it enables us to envision not what is, but what could be, while also often portraying us “as survivors, regardless of what’s happening”. “It’s only recently that we’ve put our storytelling moccasins on again and are carving out our place around the campfire” (2021, p. 152).

In humorous irony, Taylor recalls being a youngster watching the Star Trek television episode “The Paradise Syndrome” where the Enterprise crew arrives on a doomed planet populated by Native North Americans: “Threatened by an approaching asteroid, they do what all Indians did at that time: they waited for a white saviour to rescue them. And this time, his name was Kirk” (2021, p. 154).

“Everybody loves a good metaphor. And let’s face it, what people in North America have a better understanding of a strange, exotic race suddenly showing up out of nowhere with different technology and basically taking everything over? I have it on good authority that it’s happened before” (2021, p. 153).

Beneath storytelling is often interesting social science. In her book, “Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist” (1966), Hortense Powdermaker states:

“To understand a strange society, the anthropologist has traditionally immersed himself in it, learning, as far as possible, to think, see, feel, and sometimes act as a member of its culture and at the same time as a trained anthropologist from another culture. This is the heart of the participant observation method – involvement and detachment… Involvement is necessary to understand the psychological realities of a culture, that is, its meanings for the indigenous members” (1966, p. 9).

Could we flip the narrative and consider that many hundreds or thousands of years ago, our Native brothers and sisters were perhaps themselves commissioned as anthropologists from some distant star and given the task of “participant observation” in this planet’s unfolding civilizations? What might their analyses indicate about our history and current state of affairs?

Graeber, D. & Wengrow, D. (2021) The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. Toronto, Canada: Signal – McClelland & Stewart – Penguin Random House Canada

Powdermaker, H. (1966) Stranger and Friend: The Way of an Anthropologist. New York, United States: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Taylor, D. H. (2021), Strangers in a Not So Strange Land, in Me Tomorrow: Indigenous Views on the Future, Taylor, D. H., ed., (2021) (pp. 149 – 166). Madeira Park, Canada: Douglas and McIntyre (2013) Ltd.

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Culture

“If anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of choosing from amongst all the nations in the world the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably – after careful considerations of their relative merits – choose that of his own country. Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best” (Herodutus; c.480 – c.429 BCE).

Theologian Hans Küng, referencing sociologist Emile Durkheim, states primitive religions have a core of reality nested not in some divine power, but rather in the notion of kinship; both with nature, expressed through totems of animals, plants and natural phenomena; and with each other, expressed in the notion of clan. Early nature-bound traditions thus defined a template for moral behaviour in these contexts, and importantly, Küng adds, throughout the whole long history of humanity, “no people or tribe has been found without any traces of religion” (1984, p. 49).

Anthropologist and folklorist Ruth Benedict states culture evolves around a central mode of behaviour, which yields a set of “core values” (1934). Some of which, antithetical to what one’s own culture might consider rational, are instead the cornerstones of another’s societal structure, as in the case of magic practices on certain south east Asian islands, exemplified in one society,

“built on upon traits which we regard as beyond the border of paranoia. In (this) particular tribe the exogenic groups look upon each other as prime manipulators of black magic, so that one marries always into an enemy group which remains for life one’s deadly and unappeasable foes. They look upon a good garden crop as a confession of theft, for everyone is engaged in making magic to induce into his garden the productiveness of his neighbours …” (1934, p. 3).

Philosopher James Rachels explores the challenges of cultural relativism; that different cultures have different moral codes, where what is correct by one culture, can be seen as abhorrent by another, and vice versa. Such templates take the form of folkways and mores passed down through generations which contain the powerful “authority of ancestral ghosts”. The fundamental error of this view, according to Rachels, is that “right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture”, and which if we are to take seriously, would need to admit that waging war, taking slaves, or destroying an ethnic minority are rational, and that such behaviour can remain inoculated from criticism. Moreover, fundamental notions of moral progress, including basic rights and equality, could be called into doubt (1986).

Despite its shortcomings, the theory of cultural relativism has utility insofar as it warns us many of our moral standards are solely societal peculiarities, and we should not assume that all our preferences are based upon some absolute rational standard. Rachels suggests this view can thus lead us to be more understanding in our views towards others across the cultural divide:

“It is an attractive theory because it is based on a genuine insight – that many of the practices and attitudes we think so natural are really only cultural products. Moreover, keeping this insight firmly in view is important if we want to avoid arrogance and have open minds” (1986, p. 20).

Benedict, R. (1934), A Defense of Ethical Relativism, from Anthropology and the Abnormal, in The Journal of General Psychology, Issue 10, 1934, (pp. 1 – 8 ). [PDF document] Retrieved March 2022 from http://public.callutheran.edu/~chenxi/Phil315_031.pdf

Herodotus (N. D.), Herodotus the Moralist, Livius.org [HTML document] Retrieved March 2022 from https://www.livius.org/articles/person/herodotus/herodotus-7/

Küng, H. (1984) Eternal Life? Life After Death as a Medical, Philosophical, and Theological Problem, translated by Edward Quinn. Garden City, United States: Doubleday & Company Inc.

Rachels, J. (1986), The Challenge of Cultural Relativism, in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Ninth Edition (2019), (pp. 1 – 21). New York, United States: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. [PDF document] Retrieved March 2022 from https://sites.middlebury.edu/fyse1496/files/2020/08/Rachels-Challenge-of-CR.pdf